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NOTES
CONTRACT: A PROMISE OR AN AGREEMENT? *
While every contract contains one or more promises, a promise
cannot be called the essence of a contract. A promise is merely the
first step in the formation of a legal contract; it is the offer. Some-
*Awarded The St. Louis Law Review Prize for the best note written by a
member of the first year class.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
thing further is necessary before it is binding; it may lapse by passage
of time; it may be revoked by the offeror; or may be rejected by the
promisee. An offer alone creates no obligation; it must be accepted.
This offer and acceptance constitute the meeting of minds or
agreement so essential to a contract. In Stuckert v. Cann (Del. 1921),
111 Ati. 596, the court said: "Agreement is essential to a contract
and means a meeting of the minds in the same intention." Reynolds,
J., in Michael v. Kennedy (Mo. App. 1912), 148 S. W. 983, went so
far as to say that he saw no difference whatever between an agreement
and a contract; but the general rule is that a contract is an agreement
made with the intention to form legal obligations. Probably the most
comprehensive definition of agreement (formulated in Black's Law
Dictionary) is that it is "a concord of understanding and intention be-
tween two parties with respect to their relative rights and duties."
Courts are nearly unanimous as to the importance of agreement
in a contract. In Jenness v. Mt. Hope Iron Co. (1864), 53 Me. 20,
the court held: "There must be a proposition by one party, accepted
without modification by the other." There must be assent to the same
thing in the same sense. Holloway v. Wheeler (Tex. 1924), 261 S.
W. 467; Garrison v. McGimpsey (N. C. 1924), 122 S. E. 754; and
State v. Board of State Prison, 37 Mont. 278.
Until there has been agreement, by acceptance of an offer from
one party by the other, and the parties are in accord as to all material
elements of the transaction, there can be no contract. Though the
parties have drawn up some instrument if it is indefinite or incomplete
there is no obligation. Shepard v. Carpenter (1893), 54 Minn.
153. But if there is a complete meeting of minds, nothing further need
be done; and even if the parties intend to make a written contract and
do not, the agreement is enforceable. Billings v. Wilby (1918), 175
N. C. 571. "The act of acceptance closes the contract and ordinarily
nothing further is required." Roch v. Fisher (Okla. 1925), 241
Pac. 496.
In most cases the meeting of minds must be actual and real. In
Jones v. Janes (La. 1924), 101 So. 116, the court said that the free
mutual assent of parties is necessary to make a contract; anything
which destroys the reality of the assent or the meeting of minds to
which it leads, destroys also the contract. Mistakes of subject matter
('Peerless' case), mistakes of person dealt with (Jones v. C. B. & Q.
R. R. Co., 102 Nebr. 853), any material difference between offer and
acceptance (Beaumont v. Prieto, 249 U. S. 554), fraud, duress, and
severe pain from injuries (Girard v. St. L. Car Wheel Co. (Mo. 1894),
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27 S. W. 648), have been held to prevent any true aggregatio mentium.
In the last named case the court held: "The element of assent is a nec-
essary part of every contract; without it a mere writing imposes no
obligation."
This is the theoretical rule, that there can be no contract without
intent to assent. But in practice courts cannot deal with actual intent
in all cases. Assent must be inferred from words or acts and if a party
has secret intentions, unevidenced by his words he cannot plead his
want of intent in avoidance of the contract. Embry v. Hargadine-
McKittrick (1907), 127 Mo. App. 383. If words were such that a
reasonable person would consider them an offer, the offeror may avoid
on the grounds that he was merely jesting. Deitrich v. Sinnot (Iowa
1921), 179 N. W. 424.
Overt acts as well as words may constitute an acceptance and an
agreement giving rise to an implied contract. Yawger v. Joseph (Ind.
1915), 108 N. E. 774. In First Nat'l Bank v. Shaw (Tex. 1924),260
S. W., the court said that the difference between an express and an
implied contract is a matter of proof: whether the meeting of minds
shall be shown by words or acts. Thus where a party had an offer of
an automobile, his keeping it for a year and advertising it for sale was
held to be an acceptance. Ostman v. Lee (Conn. 1917), 101 At. 23.
Even acquiescence, Teith full knowledge, has been held to imply assent.
Stresenreuter Bros. v. Bowes (1924), 233 Ill. App. 143.
The doctrine of implied contract cannot, however, be carried too
far. In the case of Western Refining Co. v. Underwood (Ind. 1925),
149 N. E. 85, the appellee sued in quantum meruit for services to the
Company in aiding her brother who was employed as manager of the
appellant's oil station. It was decided that "a true implied contract is
an agreement of the parties arrived at from their acts; to recover
there must be evidence that the defendant requested the services or
assented to receiving the benefit. A somewhat similar case is the
Credit Alliance Corp. v. Sheridan Theatre Inc. (N. Y. 1925), 149 N.
E. 837. The president of the defendant corporation borrowed money
without authority and deposited it to the defendant's account. The
action was for money had and received and the court said: "One can-
not be made a debtor without his consent any more than he can be made
a creditor without his consent."
The first step toward the formation of a contract is a promise;
the result of a contract is an obligation; but the essence or criterion of
a contractual relationship is the aggregatio mentium which is psycho-
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logical harmony, inferred from the reasonable interpretation of the
words, acts, or acquiescence of the parties.
CHILTON J. ESTES, '28.
THE TEXAS BOND CASE
Probably no other recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court has been the source of such widespread discussion among the
public generally, as has the Texas Bond Case.1 Of late, numerous
noonhour discussions in financial and legal circles have been devoted
to this decision. Much if not all of the adverse criticism seems to be
due to a lick of understanding of the powers of administrative tri-
bunals, of the requirements of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and to a lack of knowledge of the pertinent facts in the
case as set forth in Mr. justice Butler's opinion.
The suit was filed in the United States District Court, northern
district, of Texas, to enjoin the sale of a bond issue of $300,000.00
for the purpose of paving and improving of roads, and to enjoin the
levy of taxes on the property of the complainants. The issue presented
was the constitutionality of the Texas statute under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The act was upheld in the district court2 and the com-
plainant took an appeal directly to the Supreme Court, under section
238 of the judicial Code.
The preliminary acts and the levy of taxes on the complainants'
land, were had under the Complete Texas Statutes of 1920, articles
627 and 628, which provide, "Any county . . . . or any political
subaivision or defined district, now or hereafter to be described and
defined, of a county," is authorized to issue bonds, not to exceed one-
fourth of the assessed valuation of the real property in the district,
for the construction of roads. (Article 627.) "Upon the petition of 50
resident property taxpaying voters of any defined district of any coun-
ty. it is the duty of the commissioners' court to order an election in the
district, as described in the petition to determine whether its bonds
shall be issued for such road purposes, and whether a tax shall be
levied upon the property of the district for their payment. (Arti-
cle 628.)
Sections 631, 634, and 637, further provide. "If two-thirds of the
1. Browning et al. vs. Hooper et al., U. S. 46 Sup. Ct. 141.
2. 3 Fed. (2nd) 160.
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